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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES Eo REED, 
Plaintiff a;nd Appellant, 
vs. 
HEPBURN T. ARMSTRONG, 
Defendant wnd Respondent. 
Case No. 8612 
BRIEF OF .APPELLANT 
L 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Spring of 1954, plaintiff was called upon b~ 
defendant to assist him in the financing of a corpor:atP 
venture to be known as Wyoming U rani urn Cor.poration 
(Tr. 6 nd 7)a 
On the 14th day of .July 1954, the partiP~ enten·d 
into a written agreement in words and figures a:-; follows. 
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''For and in consideration of the sum of Two 
'Fhousand Dollars ($2,000.00), receipt for which 
1s acknowledged I hereby covenant ·and agree to 
perfonn the following for order of James E. Reed: 
"(a) To immediately utilize One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00) to ob'tain A.E.C. certification 
of ~rtain mining (ur-anium and allied minerals) 
clarrns owned by me in the State of Wyoming, 
descripton appended hereto, it being expressly 
understood and agreed that in the event legisla. 
tion is passed making A.E.C. certification un-
necessary, then and in that event said One Thou-
sand Dollars ( $1,000.00) shall be forthwith re-
turned by me. 
"(b) To procure the formation of a cor-
porate entity to exploit and develop said mining 
cla.ims, it being presently intended that said cor-
poration shall bear the name of WYOMING 
CRAXIr~I CORPORATION, and to issue to 
James E. Reed, or order, One Hundred Thirty-
Four Thousand shares of the common capital 
stock of said corporation as soon as is possible 
after formation, except that in the event that a 
return of half of the money herein mentioned i~ 
returned bv me in accord with A, above, within 
ten davs f~om the date hereof said stock issue 
~hall ~ in the total amount of Sixty-Seven Thon-
~and (67,000) shares only. This agreement is 
based on the assumption of a public offering of 
~to<'k at .03 per share. 
"I further covenant and agree that I shall 
diligently and with dispatcl1 procure the formation 
of said oorporate entity, and in the event that 
said corporation is not formed by me or someone 
on mv behalf within a reasonable time., I agree 
t.hat tlw same James E. Reed or his designees 
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ie 
shall be entitled to have a lien upon s.aid property 
to the full extent of any moneys remaining unpaid, 
together with reasonable fees and expenses that 
may be incurred in perfecting the lie~ h~reby 
accorded and I further agree 'that I Will In no 
way enc~mber said property until this obligation 
is discharged, and I agree to pay all costs of 
enforcement, together with a reasonable Attor= 
ney's feeo 
Dated this 14th day of July 1954. 
( s) H. T. Armstrong 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
"On the 14th day of July, 1954, there person-
ally appeared before me H. T. ARMSTRONG, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
the foregoing document, and that the same wa~ 
done as his free act and deed and under w:~ th rE>h.t 
or coercion of any kind. 
( :") M a:-: Y ano, Notary Pnhhc'' 
Pursuant to the terms of the above ~wn·PrnPnt 
h . plaintiff~appellant delivered to defendant $2,000.00; $1, 
000.00 was paid directly 'to defendant and $1,000.00 wa~ 
~ immediately mailed to the Atomic Energy Cornrnrs~ron 
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Page 8 of the transcript mis-states the date of receipt 
of the referred to $2,000.00. The date is, and should 
read, July 14th. 
On the 29th day of July 1954, defendant asked 
plaintiff for ·additional money and received from plain-
tiff on said day $1,500.00, by check, plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2 (Tr. 8, Line 30; Tr. 9, Lines 1 to 28 and Tr. 42, 
Lines 1 to 30.) 
Upon the reverse side of said $1,500.00 check, issued 
to and ca.shed by defendant is : 
"Payment of $1,500.00 or part thereof a.s 
needed for 100,000 shares of stock in proposed 
Wyoming Uranium Company, enlarges agree-
ment of 7 j14j54. 
(s) Hepburn T. Armstrong'' 
Shortly after August 30, 1955, the $1,000.00 that 
had been sent to the Atomic Energy Commission was re-
turned to plaintiff-appellant (Tr. 10, Lines 12 to 20). 
The Wyoming lTranium Corporation was, in fact, 
formed. There was a suce-es,sful underwriting and plain-
tiff-appellant received from defendant 166,666 shares of 
stock of 'Vyoming Uranium Corporation. 
It was and is the position of plaintiff-appellant that 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 entitled plaintiff to 134,000 
shares of said stock, and that plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, 
entitles plaintiff to an additional 100,000 shares of said 
stock. Upon subtracting the 166,666 shares received from 
the 234,000 shares plaintiff claims entitlement to, plain-
tiff claim~ the value of 67,334 shares (Tr. 3). 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The parties stipulated that a valid demand was thus 
made by plaintiff for the 67,334 shares ('Tr, 5, Lines 1, 2, 
and 3). 
It was further stipulated that the open market value 
of the Wyoming shares, on April23, 1956, date of demand 
and refusal, was 19lf2 cents per share (Tr, 5, Lines 28 
to 30 and Tr. 6, Lines 8 to 11) 0 
Thus defendant concedes demand, refusal to deliver 
and value. Defendant of course contends that he had 
fully performed and plaintiff is entitled to nothing. 
Trial was had before the Honorable Maurice Hard-
ing, upon plaintiff's amended Complaint, plaintiff thus 
praying for damages of $13,130.13 plus interest at 6% 
from April 23, 1956, and a reasonable Attorney's fee of 
not more than $3,500.00. 
The Trial Court found the issues against plaintiff 
upon the basis: 
(1) That the Paragraph B of the parties July 14, 
1954 agreement, plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, constitutes a 
penalty and is therefore unenforceable (Tr. 61), and 
(2) That the Contr-act dated April 14, 1955, wa:-: 
modified by parol agreement of the parties and so plain-
tiff had a]ready received all he was entitl~:>d to :receiv~ 
(Tr. 61) .. 
Throughout the proceeding, plaintiff ob.Jected to oral 
testimony used by defendant and pertaining to plaintiff'~ 
Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2, but all said oh.wetJon~ werP 
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overruled by the Trial Judge (Tr. 15, 16, 17, 18, 33, 34, 
35, 36, 37, 39, and 40). 
And in response to a motion by plaintiff to strike 
all testimony ooncerning defendant's and plaintiff's 
negotiations pertaining to the written agreements of 
July 14, 1954 and July 29, 1954, plaintiff's Exhibits No.1 
and No. 2 (Tr. 55, Line 29 to Tr. 56, Line 3), the Trial 
Judge stated: 
Tr. 56, lines 4 to 6: "The evidence prior to July 
14 1nay be stricken pertaining to the negotiations, 
but the evidence subsequent to then may remain." 
It is from the judgment of no cause of action that 
this appeal is taken. 
II. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. The Trial Court erred in its ruling that Clause 
B. of plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 constitutes a penalty and 
is unenforceable. 
II. The Trial Court erred in its admission of parol 
evidence to vary the terms of written contracts, plain-
tiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2. 
III. The Trial Court erred in permitting defendant 




THE TRiAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 
CLAUSE B OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 CONSTI-
TUTES A PENALTY AND IS UNENFORCABLE. 
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It is thB position of plaintiff in this regard that the 
following language of the document that the Trial Judge 
held to be a forfeiture and unenforceable is not a pro-
vision for forfeiture. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 
"For and in consideration of the sum of Two 
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) receipt of which is 
acknowledged, I hereby covenant and agree to 
perform the following for the order of James Eo 
Reed~" 
A. This part of the agreement provides that de-
fendant is to use $1,000.00 to obtain A.E.C. certification, 
and if such becomes no longer requisite, 'to return $1,-
000.00 to plaintiff. 
The applicable part of provision B of plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1, provides: 
", 0 o o to is;sue to James E. Reed, or order, 
134,000 shares of the common capital stock of said 
Corporation 0 o 0 except if a return of one-half of 
the money herein mentioned is returned by me 
in accord wi'th A~ above, within ten (10) days 
from the date hereof said stock issue shaU be in 
the total amount nt' Stxty-SPvPn Thousand (67~-
000) shares only.'' 
The $1,000.00, though returned, was not returned 
within ten (10) days as above specified. 
By the ternts of the agreement of .July 14, 1954, de .. 
fendant agreed to and was absolutely obligated 'to; 
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(a) Return the Thousand Dollars in question, if 
not required for governmental purposes, and 
(b) Issue 140,000 shares of stock to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff wishes to stres~ the importance of this 
precept tha:t immediately upon execution, defendant was 
r·equired to return one-half of the money as well as issue 
134,000 shares. 
Part B. of the agreement is not a penalty in any 
degree, the provision for cutting the shares in half if 
one-half of the Two Thousand Dollars was returned in 
ten (10) days, which it w.as not, being merely a condition 
subsequent that never came to pass. 
A penalty or forfeiture has uniformly been held to 
he a punishment for failure to do something specified: 
Stennick vs. J. K. Lumber Company, 161 P. 97 
(Oregon): 
"In contracts and in civil matters the term 
penalty imparts a clause by which the obligor 
agrees to p.ay a certain sum of money if he shall 
FAIL or NEGLECT to perform a contradt.'' 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
McCutcheon vs. Ennon Oil Co., 135 So. E. 238 
(W.Va.): 
•• A forfeiture i~ the loss of an estate in conse-
quence of doing or ommission of some act." 
In the case at bar. defendant absolutely and unequi-
vocably .agreed to convey 134,000 shares of stock regard-
IP~~ of any rontinp;Pney. The plaintiff merely agreed 
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to relinquish one-half of those shares upon the happening 
of a condition subsequent. That condition never occur-
red. Defendant lost nothing by forfeiture, penalty or 
otherwise. He had already conveyed away 134,000 shareso 
The condition subsequent that would entitle de-
fendant to receive back 67,000 shares was beyond the con-
trol of either party. Defendant had nothing to perform, 
and no control over the condition and both parties kne~w 
of this and contracted in relation to it. 
It is respectfully urged that the legal relationship 
established was not for penalty. It may have been other-
wise, if defendant had agreed to convey 67,000 shares, 
only, plus an additional 67,000 shares if he did not return 
the money in ten (10) days. Such is not the case and 
the agreement clearly shows such was not the intent. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ADMI,SSION OF 
PAROLE EVIDENCE ~0 SHOW VARIANCE FROM THE 
TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff conltends that it is the law of the land 
that contracts, not contrary to public policy, should be 
enforced as written and that parol evidence to vary un-
ambiguous writings may not be considered. 
In the case at bar there are two agreements, neither· 
being vague nor ambiguous. 
The first agreement is dated July 14, 1954, whereby 
defendant absolutely obligated himself to deliver 134,000 
shares of stock to plaintiff. The second agreement, for 
an additional $1,500.00 absolutely obligated defendant. to 
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convey an additional 100,000 shares to plaintiff, the 
express words being" ... enlarges agreement of 7 j14j54." 
The Trial Judge held that the parties modified these 
agreements, orally (See Tr. 61). 
The following authorities abundantly support the 
proposition that oral modification or evidence thereof is 
improper if applied to cle.ar writings to vary them: 
IX. Wig,more on Evidence, Third Edition, 
Page 76: 
"When a jural act is ernbodied in a single 
memori.al, all other utterances of the parties on 
that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose 
of determining what are the terms of their act." 
"This is not a rule of evidence, because it has 
nothing to do with the probative value of one fact 
as persuading us of the probable existence of 
.another fact.'' 
"It is a rule of substantive law, because it 
deals with the question where and in what sources 
and materials are to be found the terms of a 
jural act." 
"Where two parties enter into an agreement, 
.and reduce it to writing, that writing determines 
the terms of the bargain." 
It is urged that the Trial Court erred in holding the 
ten (10) day period for return of $1,000.00 was enlarged 
by oral agreen1ent to a rea:sonable ti1ne, Tr. 61, be-cause 
~mch a finding is proscribed hy substantive law. 
In the case of r'crdivs. Helper State Bank, 196 P. 225 
(Utah), a disputP arose concerning tJw mnount of inter-
10 
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e~t to be paid on a bank deposit. The plaintiff sought to 
show by parol evidence that the written certificate of de-
posit was modified. Justice Frick, in the opinion of the 
case sta'ted that while it might be held there wa.s enough 
evidence to go to the jury as to whether or not the con-
duct of the parties indicated that a higher interest rate 
was intended, he said such submission would be reversible 
error. At Page 229, 196 Pacific, it is stated: 
"It is axiomatic that where an express con-
tract exists, one may not be implied." 
Certificates of deposit, of course, are subject to the 
.same rules as other written contracts, as is stated .at 
196 P. 227: 
''It will be observed here that the certificate 
in question was, under the law, a negotiable instru-
ment. At all events it must be treated as an in-
strument in writing which evidenced a transaction 
between the parties and hence must be considered 
in the light of the same rule:s of law and evidence 
as other written instruments." 
Vu,quist vs. B onscher, 227 P. 2nd. 83 (Ida.) : 
"Courts may not interpret an agreement so 
as to relieve one of the parties from the terms 
which he voluntarily consented to, or interpret the 
agreement to me.an something that ~t does not say, 
or interpolate into the the agreement something 
it does not contain." 
In the case at bar, plaintiff befriended 'the de-
fendant who, having volun'tarily ntade a bargain, now 
seeks to abrogate it. 'rhe importance of the money 
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advanced to defendant may be seen by noting that the 
agreement of July 14, 1954, gave plaintiff a lien on .au 
of the property of defendant to assure performance. 
Clark vs. Tidewater Oil Co., 220 P. 2nd 628 
(Calif.): 
"Construction of a written. contract contain-
ing no ambiguity or uncertainty in its terms mu~t 
be derived SOLELY from the language therein.'' 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Certainly and without .ambiguity defendant agreed, 
without condition, to convey 234,000 shares, which he 
did not do. 
Popplewell vs. Jones, 211 P. 2nd 283 (Okla.): 
"In arriving at the intention of the parties 
to a contract, the language used therein, if it is 
clear and explicit and does not involve an ob-
surdity, governs the interpretation." 
The language in the cas_e at bar involves no absurdity 
nor obscure meanings. 
Guerin vs. Kirst, 192 P. 2nd 120 (Calif.): 
"Making a new contract for litigants or re-
writing clear terms to which they have freely 
pledged their faith is not a just or proper appli-
cation of judicial function." 
Both parties freely and clearly pledged their faitb 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
East Millcreek Water Co, vs, Salt Lake Cityj 159 
Po 2nd 863 (Utah)~ 
"The Court is required to construe the con~ 
tract made by the parties rather than to make a 
contract for the parties,'·~ 
Seavey Hop vs, Pollockj 147 P~ 2nd 389, (Colo)~ 
"In construing a contract the Court must de~ 
clare the meaning of what is written and not what 
was intended to be written.~~ 
Anderson vs. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 168 P. 
966, (Utah) : 
"Where the parties make a clear .and certain 
contract, the Courts cannot do otherwi.se than 
apply and enforce its precise terms, regardless 
of whether they think the contract a good one." 
It is suggested that in the event that Wyoming 
Uranium Company had failed that the agreements here in 
controversy would be bad ones from the standpoint of 
the plaintiff. However, since it succeeded, the agreement 
becomes bad for defendant only because plain~iff could 
then benefit from his bargain, which defendant attempt~ 
to repudiate berJ8-use what he once promised of little 
value is now valuable. 
Plaintiff is entitled to the JH'P<•J:-;p enforcement of 
hil' bargain. 
Pa,qgi vs, Skltn.-,, 179 P, 739 (Utah)~ 
"Where a writ1ten agreement expre~:-;e~ thjJ 
intent of the parties in plain and unambiguous 
language, it is the duty of th~ Court to give effect 
13 
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to that language, unles·s the party executing the 
agreement was induced 'to do .so by fraud or mis-
representatioR" 
There is no such suggestion of fraud in these plead-
ings or in the evidence. D·efendant merely refuses be-
cause the very venture financed by plaintiff became a 
success .and the rights defendant bargained away are 
now valuable and he wants them back. 
Murphy vs. Salt Lake City, 236 P. 680 (Utah): 
"Contracts are prepared and entered into for 
the convenience and protection of the partie.s and 
Courts are bound to enforce them in accordance 
with intention as it is manifested by the language 
used by the parties to the contract." 
If the decision of the Trial Judge is allowed to stand, 
plaintiff will have received no protection whatever, and 
clearly expressed intent would have to be wholly ignored. 
All of the books .are replete with statements of the 
same fundamental precepts, supra Richards Irrigation 
Co. vs. lVestview, SO P 2nd. 958 (rtah) ;Middleton vs. 
Evans, 45 P. 2nd. 570 (Utah)~ TannPr rs. Title Insur-
ance Co., 129 P. 2nd. 383 (Calif.). 
The intention of the parties was that plaintiff's 
imrnediate .and absolute right to 134,000 shares of stock 
would be effected if, but only if, $1,000.00 was returned 
in ten (10) days, or by July :25, 1954. 
It is urged to be funda1nental that if tune specified 
in any agree1nent becmnes important that tl1e Courts 
will set a reasonable tin1e if none is SJWeified. 
14 
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In the case at bar, however, ten (10) days w.as set 
as the time within which defendant would benefit by 
the happening of a condition subsequent. 
The parties clearly set ten (10) days and that ex-
pressed intention may not be disturbed upon the author-
i'ty, above cited, that cle.ar contracts should be precisely 
enforced. 
POINT IIL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DE-
FENDANT TO REUUCE HIS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 
For the purposes of argument under this section, 
plaintiff urge:s that if parol modification of the agree-
ment of July 14, 1954, and July 29, 1954 is held to he 
proper (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2) then such 
modification is not enforceable as lacking in considera-
tion. 
The following statement, i't is urged, is .a statement 
of the law on this subject: 
Hames vs, R11;st j 1.36 P, 2nd 350 (Cali£,) ; 
"CONSIDERATION IS REQeiRED FOR 
MODIFICA11ION OR S"CB~'l~ITUTlON 0 F' 
CONTRACTS " (Emphas1.s suppl Jed) 
Plaintiff, of course, denies there was an~· modifiea 
tion, aside from arguing as a matter of substantive law 
that evidence pertaining thereto is in1proper 
But, assumin,g such evidence i~ proper and that th"' 
evidence shows a nwdification, such modifieation to hf 
15 
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enforceable against this Plaintiff mu.st be for considera-
tion. 
There was none. 
In this regard, plaintiff reralizes the difficulty in 
the assertion of .a negative, but urges that defendant, 
in his asser'tion of modification should also be compelled 
to show consideration. The transcript is devoid of any 
such .showing, except on affirmative admission by de-
fendant that there was none. 
The following elicited upon cross-examination of 
defendant demonstrates plaintiff'·s position to be clear in 
this regard. 
Commencing at Tr. 43: 
"Q, It was after you had taken this check 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No.2) that you have testified, 
that Mr. Reed agreed the original agreement 
would be modified to, what was it, 66,000? 
A, That is right. The original $1,000.00 and 
at a cent and a half is 66,000 shares. 
Q. This was after you received this check? 
A. Oh, no, that was in our conversation be-
fore he gave n1e the check, and this check, as it 
says here, it modifies this agreement. 
Q. What doe•s it s.ay, read 1t, will you? 
A. Sure. 
Q. It says ''Inodifies"-
A. It says "enlarges agreement.n 
Q. Of July 14th.? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That word "enlarges'' wa~ on there at the 
t1me you cashed it? 
A. Tha't is right. 
Q .. That isn't modification- you don't claim 
16 
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there has been a change there in the writings on 
the hack of that check, Exhibit 21 
A. No. 
Q. You read that before you cashed itt 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it already determined Mr. Reed 
would be the underwriter of this company on this 
approximate date 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, if you claim he re-
linquished some .shares July 14, you didn't pay 
hhn .anything for doing it, did you, you didn't 
refund then any money to him, did you 1 
A. Sure, the $1,000.00 returned from the 
A.E.C. 
Q. Wasn't it to returned under the July 
14th agreement 1 
A. It wasn't used for mineral leases. 
Q. What you claimed you gave back to him, 
he didn't pay you, you gave him back the 
$1,000.001 
A. The A.E.C. did. I didn't get it. 
Q. You didn't give him anything in addi'tion 
at that time .at all, did you 1 
A. No. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of his bargain, 
to-wit: the value of 67,334 share·s on date of demand and 
refusal which is conceded to be 19.5 Cents per share, for 
a total of $13,130.13, and interest at 6% thereon frorn 
April 23, 1956. 
It is the duty of the Courts to sustain contracts that 
are deliberately entered into between parties. The integ-
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rity of written agreements, clear and unequivocal, should 
be held inviolate. 
On July 14, 1954, defendant bargained to convey 
stock to plaintiff in a sum certain. That agreement was 
enlarged by more writing, upon payment of more money. 
Plaintiff risked hrs capital with the defendant upon 
precise terms. It is clear that their bargain now has a 
gre.at value to both parties. 
If defendant is permitted to rescind he is unju_stlr 
enriched at the expense of plaintiff who made the whole 
plan capable of success in the first instance by perform-
ing his entire obligations under 'the written agre€ments 
in evidence in this case. 
Defendant's entire position could be summarized: 
"If this thing turn,s out sour, you lose. If this 
venture turns out well, you still lose, because I 
gave you what I consider is enough, anyway." 
Such precept offends good conscience, morality and 
the substan'tive law of the land. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
506 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, rtah 
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Received two true copies hereof; thi_s ________________ day of 
1\{arch, 1957. 
J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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